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Policy tsars: here to stay but more transparency needed
Government ministers have appointed over 260 policy tsars since May 1997. Tsars are privileged players in
the policy drama, handpicked by ministers and given direct access to them and senior officials. Although
policy tsars lack imperial force, they can be hugely powerful advisors. Potentially each tsar has the power to
influence ministers and policies directly and personally, and many of them have used this power strongly.
Until Dr Ruth Levitt and William Solesbury did detailed empirical research on tsars, no-one seemed to
know the scale or scope of these appointments nor what difference they have made.
When the Public Administration Select Committee f irst said in 2010[1] that there was “litt le transparency
concerning the inf ormal and ad hoc appointments made by government”, it could not underpin its concern
with thorough or independent research about the tsar phenomenon. The Coalit ion government was
largely dismissive of  the committee’s recommendations at the time, even though it too was in the dark
about the extent or impact of  the advice that tsars provide. Indeed, governments still do not keep a
central record of  these appointments despite PASC recommending this.
We f irst contacted the Cabinet Of f ice about our research on tsars in the Spring of  2012 but the Prime
Minister and Cabinet Of f ice Minister were still claiming in August that policy making was an internal
monopoly. Francis Maude even proclaimed that: “For the f irst t ime ever [our emphasis] ministers are
directly commissioning policy advice f rom outside Whitehall moving towards our goal of  opening up policy
making.” [2] PASC has just repeated [3] the call f or greater transparency in ad hoc appointments made by
governments. Our empirical evidence brings tsars out of  the shadows f or the f irst t ime.
Tsars hit the headlines f rom time to t ime. Af ter the recent shambles over the West Coast rail route
f ranchise decision, the new Transport Secretary picked Richard Brown, Chairman of  Eurostar, to look at
the whole rail f ranchising process. Earlier in the year Adrian Beecrof t, a hedge f und manager and large
donor to the Conservative Party, recommended loosening employment protection law. Tom Winsor,
lawyer and f ormer rail regulator, recommended changes to police f orce terms and conditions. Many other
tsars are barely visible. What is their role making public policy?
They are advisors: individuals f rom outside government (though not necessarily f rom outside polit ics)
who are publicly appointed by ministers to advise them on policy on the basis of  their expertise. Tsars
exist alongside other sources of  external expertise that governments draw on, such as expert
committees, consultants and researchers, commissions of  inquiry, think tanks, prof essionals like lawyers
or economists, and other inf ormal advisers, including journalists,  whom ministers and civil servants
f requently chat to.
The Cabinet Of f ice does not keep a central record of  tsars. The prevailing view is that they are
insignif icant in numbers and cost and of ten usef ul. Our recent research at King’s College London shows
a dif f erent story on numbers. We have identif ied over 260 tsar appointments made by ministers since
1997.
The annual rate has risen dramatically through the three New Labour administrations and  the Coalit ion,
whose ministers had so f ar appointed over 90 tsars up to the end of  July 2012. It is high time to
recognise that tsars, along with ministers, of f icials and special advisers, are part of  the central
government architecture of  policy making.
Tsars complement tradit ional sources of  external expertise f or policy development. In practice the
commission of  inquiry is much more rare now; budgets f or hiring consultants and researchers are under
tighter control, and the Coalit ion’s bonf ire of  the quangos is slimming the numbers of  advisory bodies.
Meanwhile tsars are willing, available and highly f lattered to be asked to give ministers ideas and
suggestions to tackle pressing concerns, f or example Prof essor Alison Wolf  on vocational education
and Sir Scott Baker QC on extradit ion laws. Tsars can also help by ref raming issues to provide innovative
thinking on seemingly intractable problems. Adair Turner on pensions or Andrew Dilnot on social care are
examples. Another way tsars contribute is by inf orming the terms of  policy debate, as Sir Nicholas Stern
did with the economics of  climate change.
Ministers clearly like this way of  getting expert advice. Our research shows that they f ind it speedy (6 to
12 months is the common turnround), cheap (tsars work part- t ime and are of ten unpaid), inf ormal (most
tsars are already known by or known of  by the minister who appoints them), authoritative (most tsars
have existing reputations in their own f ield, some are already public f igures) and reports come direct
(rather than via of f icials). However, tsars are not at all diverse: 85% were males, 83% were over 50 when
appointed  and 98% were ethnically white.
Some appointments have a polit ical purpose, whether seeking to neutralize anticipated crit icism (such as
the Coalit ion invit ing Frank Field MP to advise it on poverty and lif e chances) or to thank ministers just
reshuf f led out of  of f ice (as when Gordon Brown appointed f ormer Sports Minister Richard Caborn MP
as Ambassador f or the 2018 World Cup). Ministers also appoint high prof ile f igures to tsar roles to add a
bit of  glamour and generate usef ul PR: David Cameron and Nick Clegg jointly asked Mary Portas to
review the f uture of  the high street. PASC had already commented: “The allegation that some of  these
posts might have been created f or the sake of  a press notice may be unf air, but it is dif f icult to ref ute
without greater transparency.” [4]
In our view tsars are here to stay. They can play a usef ul role in policy development. So it is imperative
that their recruitment, terms of  ref erence, payment, access, approach and reporting are made much more
transparent, while retaining the inf ormality that is benign. This should help to ensure both propriety and
ef f ectiveness. At the moment neither the Commissioner f or Public Appointments nor the Cabinet Of f ice
oversees tsars. Ministers and departments make it up as they go along and actual practices vary wildly.
About 20% of  tsars did not produce a published report, and not all reports received a published
ministerial response. Nor is there any accumulation of  experience about tsars, either within each
department or across departments.
It is t ime to sort this out. We need more transparency about tsar appointments, their remits, their
conduct and progress, their outputs and ef f ectiveness. Our recommendations would help to bring the
tsar phenomenon out of  the shadows.
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1. The riots and phone hacking saga remind us how f ragile public conf idence in government and
corporations has become. Greater leadership, transparency and accountability are the f irst steps
towards regaining this trust. (16.5)
2. A discussion on the f inancing of  polit ical parties is desperately needed. Government is wasting
more than money if  it  buries research on the dif f icult choices between public f unding and capped
donations (14.7)
3. The introduction of  a living wage f or London is needed to prevent hard working f amilies f rom
slipping into poverty and to address the growing inequalit ies that are damaging our society (14.6)
4. The representation of  LibDems in the cabinet committee system evinces a greater role f or the
party in policy making across government than might have otherwise have been supposed (12.5)
